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A DISCUSSION OF THE APPLICATION OF FICA AND
FUTA TO INDIAN TRIBES' ON-RESERVATION
ACTIVITIES
Robyn L Robinson*

L Introduction
The question of whether federal employment taxes extend to Indian tribes'
on-reservation activities is unsettled. Both proponents and opponents of the
application can point to numerous factors to support or oppose the argument
that federal employment taxes extend to Indian tribes' on-reservation activities.
In this unsettled area, it is appropriate to give weight to the fact that Congress
has the federal employment tax statutes and has not made changes with
respect to the FICA and FUTA provisions and their application to Indian
tribes. In stark contrast, the congressional amendment of the federal
withholding provisions in 1994 provides that withholding provisions apply to
Indian tribes. It is clear that the case for nonapplication is strongest where the
activities occur on the Indian reservation, because the policy reasons for
nonapplication of federal taxes in general are strongest when the activities are
located on tribal lands.'
To support the position that federal unemployment taxes do not apply to
Indian tribes, this article considers the current position of the courts and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the intent of Congress in enacting statutes
dealing with federal unemployment taxes. The FICA and FUTA provisions
are silent as to whether they apply to Indian tribes. Thus, it is necessary to
ask whether Congress intended for federal employment taxes to apply to
Indian tribes' on-reservation activities. One argument with respect to this
congressional silence is that the FICA and FUTA provisions are statutes of
general application, which generally do not apply to Indian tribes. However,
the current Supreme Court posture suggests that statutes of general application
do apply to Indian tribes. A close analysis of this Supreme Court opinion in
shows that it is limited to an issue under the Federal Power Act? It would

*LL.M., 2000, University of Florida; J.D., 1998, Santa Clara University; B.A., 1994,
Occidental College. As a native New Mexican, the author has a special interest in the taxation

of Indian tribes.
1. See Part V.A for a discussion of federal income taxes and "income derived from the land."
In addition, the Supreme Court has distinguished on-reservation activities with respect to state
taxation. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1975) (creating an on/off
distinction for gross receipts taxes as applied to off-reservation activity).
2. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960); discussion
infra Part VI.A.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

be overreaching to extend a rule based on analysis of the Federal Power Act

to federal unemployment taxes.
Regarding the question of congressional intent, this article will examine the

statutory framework of FICA and FUTA. Although the Supreme Court has
not addressed the issue, the IRS takes the position that Congress has intended
for federal employment taxes to apply to Indian tribes? In contrast, the IRS

has taken the position that federal income taxes do not apply to Indian tribes.'
Although the IRS provides no statutory or case law support for this latter
position, they have provided no explanation as to why one tax applies to the
tribe while the other does noL

Directly on the issue, the Ninth Circuit in a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel'

6
opinion and the District Court of Nevada agree with the IRS that Congress

has intended that federal employment taxes apply to Indian tribes. Apart from
a singular Bankruptcy Appellate Panel opinion in the Ninth Circuit, none of
the circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals has addressed the issue as
to whether Congress has intended federal employment taxes to apply to Indian
tribes' on-reservation activities.
Based on the limited authority on point, it is not clear whether Congress
intends for employment taxes to apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation
activities. Therefore, we must examine what Congress has specifically said
with respect to'certain federal taxes. In addition, we must ponder what the
Supreme Court has said with respect to the application of federal income tax
to Indian tribes' on-reservation activities. As a backdrop to this discussion,
this article will consider the notion that general statutes do not apply to Indian
tribes, the doctrine of Indian sovereignty, and the canons of construction in
favor of Indian tribes.
Congress has expressly described when particular federal taxing statutes
apply to Indian tribes. To assume that congressional silence demonstrates an
affirmation that all federal taxing statutes apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation
activities ignores historical policies of bringing Indian tribes to a state of
competency and independence.
II. Statutory Framework
In addressing the question of whether Congress has intended for
employment taxes to apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation activities, we must

3. See Rev. Rul. 59-354, 1959-2 C.B. 24; see also Rev. Rul. 56-110, 1956-1 C.B. 488; infra
Part III.A.
4. See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55; see also Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19; infra
Part IV.C.
5. See In re Cabazon Indian Casino v. IRS, 57 B.R. 398 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); infra Part
II.B.
6. See Washoe Tribes v. United States, 44 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 79-6006 (D. Nev. 1979); infra
Part III.B.
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look to the statutes for evidence of congressional intent. The Federal
Insurance Contributions Act7 and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act8 both
impose a tax on employers; however, neither statute mentions whether Indian
tribes are included as "employers."
A. FederalInsurance ContributionsAct
The Federal Insurance Contributions Act! imposes an excise tax on
employers under section 3111 of the Internal Revenue Code to fund the social
security system for disability, survivors, and retirement benefits. The tax is
in the nature of an "excise tax" on the privilege of establishing and
maintaining the relationship of employer and employee. Section 3111 imposes
an excise tax on every employer, with respect to having individuals in his
employ, equal to a percentage of wages paid by him with respect to
employment. The FICA tax consists of two portions, old age survivors and
disability insurance financed by the Social Security Tax, and hospital
insurance financed by the Medicare Tax. For employers paying wages after
1990, the employer must pay tax at a rate of 6.2%."o The employment wage
base for the social security tax is $76,200 for the year 2000." The Medicare
tax rate is 1.45% with respect to wages paid after December 31, 1985." The
employment wage base for Medicare tax is unlimited.
Section 3111 provides that the excise tax is imposed on "every employer."
Employer is not defined in the Federal Insurance Contributions Act. Section
3121(a) defines "wages" in general to include all remuneration for
employment, including the cash value of all remuneration, including benefits,
paid in any medium other than cash. 3 In general "wages" means all
payments received for employment with certain specified exceptions." In
addition, section 3121(b) defines "employment" as "any service of whatever
nature performed" with certain specified exceptions. Employment with the
Indian tribe is not mentioned as one of the specified exceptions. Unless the
payments are excepted from the term wages, or the services performed are

7. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
8. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1994).
9. I.R.C. § 3128 (1994). Chapter 21 of Subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code is known
as the Federal Insurance Contributions Tax Act.
10. Id § 311 1(a). The employee also pays a tax at 6.2%. lI. § 3101(a).

11. INTERNAL REvENUE SERv., DEP'r oF H TREAsuRY, PUB. No. 15, CIRcuLAR E,
EMPLoYER's TAX GUIDE (2000) [hereinafter EMPLOYERS TAX GUIDE].
12. I.R.C. § 3111(b)(6) (1994). The employee also pays a tax at 1.45%. Id. § 3101(bX6).
All wages are subject to the Medicare tax. EMPLOYER'S TAX GUIDE, supra note 11.
13. I.R.C. § 3121(a) (1994).
14. li Section 3121(a)(l-21) of the Code provides a list of exceptions, none of which

mention Indian tribes.
15. I.R.C. § 3121(b)(1-21) (1994) (listing exceptions to employment, none of which mention
Indian tribes).
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excepted from the term employment, the IRS has taken the position that such
6
payments will be subject to FICA tax.'
B. Federal Unemployment Tax Act
7
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act imposes an excise tax on "every
employer" with respect to having individuals in his employ, equal to 6.2% in
the case of calendar years 1988 through 2007 of the total wages paid by him
during the calendar year with respect to employment."' The purpose of the
FUTA tax is to establish a provident fund for needy workers through a system
of taxation. 9 Like FICA, the exaction required from the employer is with
respect to the relationship of employer and employee." The tax rate is based
on a wage base of $7000, meaning that it applies to the first $7000 of wages
2
paid to each employee during each year. ' The employer is allowed a partial
credit against the 6.2% tax based on its state unemployment insurance tax
liability which results in a net rate of 0.8% paid by most employers.'
Like FICA, the FUTA tax is imposed on "every employer." However, the
FUTA provisions define "employer" as: (1) any person who paid wages of
$1500 or more during any calendar quarter in any calendar year; or (2) any
person who employed at least one individual in employment for some portion
of the day on each of some twenty days during the calendar year or during
the preceding calendar year, each day being in a different calendar week.'
The Code does provide a special definition for agricultural labor and for
domestic service, but otherwise the definition of "employer" is broad.' The
amendments to the definition of "employer" in section 3306(a) have decreased
the number of employees from eight to four to one over the years." Despite
the reconsiderations of FUTA occasioned by these changes in the number of

16. INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., GUIDE TO INDIAN TAX IssuEs 8 (1994).

17. I.R.C. § 3311 (1994). Chapter 23 of Subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code is known
as the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
18. Id. § 3301(1). The rate changes to 6% in 2008. Id § 3301(2).
19. See Hearst Publications v. United States, 70 F.Supp. 666, affd, 168 F.2d 751 (N.D. Cal.
1946).

20. However, FUTA only consists of an employer portion.
21. EMPLOYER'S TAX GUIDE, supra note 11.
22. I.R.C. § 3302 (1994). Section 3302 allows for a partial credit to an employer based on
state unemployment insurance tax liability. If entitled to the maximum credit of 5.4%, the tax rate
after the credit results in a net rate of 0.8% actually paid by most employers. See EMPLOYER'S
TAX GUIDE, supra note 11. Unless the State imposes State unemployment taxes and the Indian
tribes are required to pay the State unemployment taxes, then the tribes receive no credit against

FUTA.
23. I.R.C. § 3306(a) (1994).
24. Id. § 3306(a)(3), (4). There is no special rule for Indian tribes.
25. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 114(a), (c),
90 Stat. 2667, 2669; Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, Pub. L
No. 91-373, § 101(a), 84 Stat. 695, 696; Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1212, Pub. L. No. 83-767, §
1,68 Stat. 1130, 1130.
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employees required in the definition of "employer," there has been no change
with respect to Indian tribes. Congress has had the statute before them several
times and has not mentioned Indian tribes.
"Wages" and "employment" for purposes of FUTA are defined in section
3306 in the same manner as defined for FICA.' Similarly, the IRS has taken
the position that unless the payments are excepted from the term "wages" or
the services performed by the employee are excepted from the term
"employment" such payments will be subject to FUTA tax." The FUTA

provisions do provide a definition of employer, based on either the amount of
wages paid per year, or the employment of at least one individual for a

portion of the day over a specified period.' The FUTA provisions do not
specifically mention that they apply to Indian Tribes.
C. Conclusion
Neither the FICA nor FUTA provisions mention Indian tribes. In order to
determine whether the FICA and FUTA provisions apply to Indian tribes' onreservation activities, we need to know whether Congress intended the taxes
to apply to Indian tribes. Under the statutory scheme, Congress is silent as to
whether FCA and FUTA apply to Indian tribes. We need to determine
whether the employment taxes are statutes of general application that apply
to all employers, including Indian tribes, or whether Congress should have
specifically stated its intent that the taxes apply to Indian tribes. In answering
the question as to whether Congress intended for employment taxes to apply
to Indian tribes on-reservation activities, we will first examine authority on
point.
I1.Authority on Point
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether the
FICA and FUTA taxes apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation activities, the IRS
in several revenue rulings has held that the tribes are subject to the employer's
share of FCA and FUTA." In agreement with the IRS are the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate PaneP and the District Court of Nevada." Aside

26. See I.R.C. § 3306(b), (c)(1994).
27. INTERNAL REvENUE SERv., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GuIDE To INDiAN
TAXAT[ON IssuEs 8 (1994).

28. I.R.C. § 3306(a) (1994).
29. See Rev. Rul. 59-354, 1959-2 C.B. 24; see also Rev. Rul. 56-110, 1956-1 C.B. 488; infra
Part III.A.
30. See In re Cabazon Indian Casino v. IRS, 57 B.R. 398 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); infra Part
III.B.
31. See Washoe Tibes v. United States, 44 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 79-6006 (D. Nev. 1979); infra
Part HI.B.
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from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in the Ninth Circuit, the United States
Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue.
A. Treatment by the IRS
The IRS in revenue rulings has asserted that FICA and FUTA apply to
Indian tribes. Revenue Ruling 68-493, which deals with an Indian employee's
liability for the employee portion of FICA and FUTA, held that services
and FUTA
performed by an Indian employee are not exempt from RCA
2
merely because the Indian is a ward of the United States? As the most
recent revenue ruling with respect to federal employment taxes, it is
instructive in its holding that the relationship between the Indians and the
United States should not affect employment tax liability.
In Revenue Ruling 59-354, the IRS held that amounts paid to Indian tribal
council members for services performed3as council members do not constitute
wages for purposes of FCA and FUTA However, with respect to amounts
paid to other salaried employees of such Indian councils and to employees of
private tribal business enterprises, the IRS said that these amounts constitute
"wages" subject to Federal employment taxes.' The first conclusion that
tribal council members' wages are not subject to employment taxes is based
on the IRS's review of court decisions and legislative enactments pertaining
to Indian tribes. 5 The IRS's conclusion is based on an exemption provided
by another federal statute, section 16 of the Wheeler-Howard Act. The ruling
states that the powers vested in the tribe or tribal council by existing law
within the meaning of section 16 of the Wheeler-Howard Act, 25 U.S.C. 476,
do not constitute employment for federal tax purposes.' The IRS in its
second conclusion that services performed by other salaried employees of
tribal councils and by employees of tribal businesses constitute employment
did not provide supporting authority. The IRS makes this conclusion based
on the absence of authority for an exemption. The distinction drawn here is
not based on where the services are performed, whether on or off the
reservation, but by virtue of the type of service involved. The IRS has found
that Congress did not intend for services performed by tribal council members
in their capacity as such are subject to employment taxes. However, the IRS
stated that Congress did intend for employment taxes to apply to other
employment situations. Based on this ruling, the Indian tribe would be subject
to employment taxes with respect to services provided by employees with the
exception of tribal council members.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Rev. Rul. 68-493, 1968-2 C.B. 426.
Rev. Rul. 59-354, 1959-2 C.B. 24.
lId
Id
Id
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In Revenue Ruling 56-110, the IRS held that an Indian tribe is subject to
FUTA on tribal business enterprise operations." The tribal business
enterprise at issue was organized and operated by the tribe itself with the
approval and under the supervision and control of the Department of Interior.
The ruling specifically says that an activity constituting a tribal business
definition of employment under section
enterprise is not excepted from the
3306(c) of the FUTA provisions."8 Although the ruling does not distinguish
between enterprises operating on or off the reservation, it does tell us that the
IRS takes the position that Congress intended for FUTA to apply to tribal
business operations organized under tribal law.
The IRS thus takes the position that federal employment taxes apply to the
Indian tribe, with the exception of services provided by tribal council
members. The position is reflected in more recent private letter rulings" In
Private Letter Ruling 90-43-066, the IRS ruled that a federally recognized
Indian tribe was subject to FICA tax.'0 In Private Letter Ruling 90-45-037,
the IRS noted that Indian tribes are treated in the same manner as private
employers with respect to FCA and FUTA taxes. ' It is clear that the IRS
believes that Congress intended for federal employment taxes to apply to
Indian tribes, except in the case of tribal council members.
B. Case Law
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit in In
re Cabazon agreed with the IRS that Congress intended for federal
employment taxes to apply to an Indian tribe.' In re Cabazon involved an
Indian tribe that operated a casino on the reservation, which was a debtor in
possession 3 The Indian tribe claimed an exemption from federal
unemployment taxes by virtue of the Casino's status as an Indian tribe." The
Appellate Panel held that the Indian tribe was not exempt from the federal
unemployment taxes for the following reasons: (1) the tribe is not a state or
independent sovereign exempt from taxation; (2) the tribe is not "implicitly

37. Rev. Rul. 56-110, 1956-1 C.B. 488 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Private Letter Rulings are informal authority which may not be used or cited as
precedent. I.R.C. § 61 10(j)(3).
40. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-43-066 (Oct.26, 1990).
41. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-45-037 (Nov. 12, 1993) (ruling specific to an employee's responsibility
for employment taxes and not the employer's responsibility).
42. In re Cabazon Indian Casino v. IRS, 57 B.R. 398 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
Indian tribe was not exempt from excise taxes under FICA and FUTA as either a "state" or

instrumentality of a state).
at 399.
43. lit
44. lit
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exempt" from taxation; and (3) the tribe did not come within an exception
available with respect to "income derived from the land.""
With respect to the first conclusion, the Appellate Panel relied on Supreme
Court opinions holding that Indian tribes are not states for purposes of federal
In addition, the Appellate Panel cited to
excise tax exemptions.'
47
Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. Kurtz for the Ninth
Circuit's position that Indian tribes are not States for the purpose of an
4
exemption from federal excise taxes. With respect to the second conclusion,
the Appellate Panel relies on the Supreme Court's holding that tax exemptions
9
are not granted by implication.' With respect to the third conclusion, the
Appellate Panel relies on a Court of Claims opinion, Critzer, for its analysis
of what constitutes income derived directly from the land, which does not
include income from the businesses or buildings located on tax-exempt land,
such as the casino involved here.Y The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, thus, is
in accord with the IRS that Congress has intended for employment taxes to
apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation activity. In In re Cabazon, the casino
was operated on the reservation."'
The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada in Washoe Tribes v.
United States agrees with the IRS that an Indian tribe is subject to FUTA.'
In Washoe Tribes, the tribe sought a refund of amounts paid pursuant to an
IRS determination that the tribe was liable for federal unemployment taxes for
wages paid to member employees.' The case provides no details as to
whether these services were performed on or off the reservation. Although we
might infer from "member employees," that the activity took place on the
reservation, it is not always true that services performed by "member
5
employees" occur on the reservation. '
These two opinions are the only authorities from the courts that address the
issue of whether employment taxes apply to Indian tribes. The Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel decision has more weight than the district court opinion and

45. hIe
46. IL at 400 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)
and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
47. 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1982).
48. ld at 881 (holding a federal Indian tribe was not exempt from federal excise taxes on
fuel and motor vehicles); infra Part 1V.B.
49. In re Cabazon, 57 B.R. at 401 (citing Mescalem Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145,
156 (1973)).
50. Id at 402 (citing Critzer v. U.S., 597 F.2d 708 (Ct. CI. 1979)); see infra Part V.A for
a discussion of income derived from the land.
51. ld at 399.
52. Washoe Tribes v. United States, 44 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 79-6006 (D. Nev. 1979) (holding
that FUTA applies to an Indian tribe).
53. d
54. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding that the operation
of a business outside of Indian Country is subject to gross receipts tax).
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is binding on the Ninth Circuit unless the decision is overturned or the United
States Court of Appeals decides the issue-'
C. Conclusion
The IRS in a series of revenue rulings, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of
the Ninth Circuit, and the District Court of Nevada all agree that Congress has
intended that FICA and FUTA apply to an Indian tribe. Revenue Rulings do
not have the force and effect of law.' The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
decision may bind the Ninth Circuit and not other circuits. However, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals could come out differently on the issue. If the
Supreme Court or an appellate court faces the issue of whether Congress
intended for employment taxes to apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation
activities, the courts will need to examine what Congress has said with respect
to other federal taxes and their application to the tribes, as well as any policy
reasons in favor of not taxing the tribe.
IV. FederalTaxation of Indian Tribe
Although, as noted previously, the Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue, the Internal Revenue Code does contain statutory provisions which
expressly apply the federal tax statutes to the Indian tribe, or expressly exempt
the Indian tribe or Indians from specific federal taxes
A. Provisionsof the Internal Revenue Code
1. Withholding, I.R.C. § 3402(r)
Congress in section 3402(r) of the Internal Revenue Code has said that
Indian tribes are required to withhold certain taxable payments of Indian
casino profits."5 The withholding of income tax is required by the employer
on the wages paid to employees. The concern here is with the employer's

55. Bankruptcy court orders and judgments may be appealed to the district court or to a
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in circuits where they exist (e.g. Ninth Circuit), or where no such
panel exists to the circuit court of appeals. Bankruptcy appellate panel decisions are reviewable
if at all in the court of appeals. See GUIDE TO FEDERAL NINTh CiRcurr CIVIL APPELLATE
PRACICE, CALIFoRNIA NINTh CRCUrr 1:15 to 1:173-73 CA PRACTICE (chapter l-B)
(Christopher A. Goelz & Meredith J. Watts, eds., Cole Benson, contributing ed. chapter I-B,
1999). Based on the rules of practice, it then follows that the BAP decision has more weight than
a district court decision but could have less weight than a United States Court of Appeals

decision.
56. See generally Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1942); Helverling v. Wilshire Oil
Co., 308 U.S. 90 (1939).
57. See I.R.C. §§ 3402(r), 7871; infra Part IV.A.1, IV.A.2.
58. I.R.C. § 3402(r) (1994). This section is part of Chapter 24 of Subtitle C of the Internal
Revenue Code.
59. In comparing withholding taxes with FICA and FUTA, note that FICA has an employer
and employee portion and FUTA is a tax on the employer. For a discussion of FICA and FUTA,
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responsibility to withhold income from certain wages paid to member
employees. Congress made a choice in section 3402(r) that it applies to Indian
tribes.
The general rule of section 3402(r)(1) states that:
Every person, including an Indian tribe, making a payment to a
member of an Indian tribe from the net revenues of class II or
class I gaming activity conducted or licensed by such tribe shall
deduct and withhold from such payment a tax in an amount equal
to such payment's proportionate share of the annualized tax.'
Congress chose to add this subsection to the withholding provisions in 1994.
Public Law 103-465 made clear that Congress intended that an Indian tribe
withhold on payments made to member employees from the net revenues of
certain casino profits."' Withholding applies to net revenues from class II or
class I gaming activities conducted or licensed by the tribe'
Congress added this particular withholding provision to deal with net
revenues from casinos paid to tribal members. In specifically stating that
every person includes an Indian tribe, we have an instance where Congress
chose to address a situation where the withholding provisions apply to Indian
tribes. One argument is that Congress added this section to the withholding
provisions because the statute is otherwise a statute of general application not
applicable to Indian tribes. Similarly, with respect to FICA and FUTA, had
Congress intended for these employment taxes to apply to the Indian tribe as
employer, then it could have easily amended the Code to make its intent clear.
On the other hand, a counterargument may be that Congress has assumed that
employment taxes apply to Indian tribes since their enactment and there is no
need for amendment. The problem with the latter argument is that if we allow
Congress to go back and amend a statute of general application by assuming
it applies to Indian tribes, then it is the equivalent of making an amendment
to the statute without having to make the actual amendment.
2. Tribal Tax Act, I.R.C. § 7871
Section 7871 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Tribal Tax Act, tells us
when Indian tribal governments will be treated as states with respect to certain
taxes.' The statute exempts the Indian tribe from a variety of excise taxes
imposed on sellers of certain items if purchased by the tribe and used in
connection with the exercise of an essential government function." Section
see supra Part ILA, ll.B.
60. I.R.C. § 3402(r)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
61. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. I No. 103-465, § 701(a), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
The provision is effective with respect to payments made after December 31, 1994.
62. Id.
63. I.R.C. § 7871 (1994).

64. lM. § 7871(b). The specific excise taxes mentioned arise in chapter 31 (relating to tax
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7871 does not treat the tribes as states for purposes of federal employment
taxes. In addition, the Tribal Tax Act does not mention the application of
income taxes to Indian tribes. One commentator has noted that congressional
failure to address the tax status of tribal income represents a serious weakness
in the Tribal Tax Act. Similarly, congressional failure to address the federal
employment tax status of tribes represents another weakness in the Tribal Tax
Act. The counterargument to Congress' failure to address income tax or
employment tax in the Tribal Tax Act is that Congress specifically addressed
only the situations where it thought that tribes should be treated as states and
exempt from particular taxes. Those situations excluded from the Tribal Tax
Act were situations where Congress did not intend for tribes to be treated as
states.
3. Conclusion
The specific mention of the application of section 3402(r) of the Internal
Revenue Code to Indian tribes and the failure to mention employment taxes
under section 7871 of the Internal Revenue Code provide us with two
different ways to assess whether Congress has intended the federal
employment taxes to apply to Indian tribes. On the one hand, we have an
amendment to a statute where Congress chose to specifically state that the
particular provision, the withholding of certain taxable payments of casino
profits, applied to Indian tribes. On the other hand, we have the Tribal Tax
Act which mentions several excise taxes to which tribes may be exempt, but
which does not mention the tribe's liability for federal employment taxes.
Congress in enacting the Tribal Tax Act wanted to provide some certainty as
to when a tribe could be treated as a state. Although there is no mention of
federal employment taxes in section 7871, this simply means that Congress
may not have intended for tribes to be treated as states for these purposes.
Similarly, the failure to mention Indian tribes within the FICA and FUTA
provisions indicates that Congress may not have intended for FICA and
FUTA to apply to Indian tribes. Thus, we should not be left to assume
Congress' intent. Congress can and has amended the federal employment tax
statutes to state that they specifically apply to Indian tribes in section 3402(r)
of the Code.
B. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit in ConfederatedTribes considered whether federal excise
taxes applied to an Indian tribe." None of the other circuits have decided the
on special fuels), chapter 32 (relating to manufacturers excise taxes), subchapter B of chapter 33
(relating to communications excise tax) or subchapter D of chapter 36 (relating to tax on use of
certain highway vehicles).
65. Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process, 46
ADMIN. L. Ray. 333, 340 (1994).

66. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
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tax liability of an "Indian tribe." Confederated Tribes involved four separate
'
excise taxes: (1) a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles, (2) a
tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles,' (3) a tax on special fuels used
in motor vehicles, ' and (4) a tax on manufacturing," in this case of a truck
chassis assembled by the tribe' The tribe in its sawmill used the fuel and
engaged in the activities with respect to which the taxes were assessed.' The
tribe claimed that it was exempt from the excise taxes under provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code that exempt states and political subdivisions of states
from the liability for excise taxes." In the alternative, the tribe argued that
other federal statutes as well as the tribe's treaty with the United States
exempt it from the federal excise taxes.7 ' The Court of Appeals held that the
tribe was subject to the excise taxes because it was not a state or political
subdivision of a state and that there was no federal statute or language in a
treaty that exempt the tribe from the tax. s
With respect to the court's first conclusion, the Code exempts from liability
for federal excise taxes "any State, any political subdivision of a State, or the
District of Columbia."'76 The court examined the Code and regulations and
found that there was no mention of Indian tribes as part of the exemption for
state governments. With respect to the court's second conclusion, the court
pointed out that a court will imply a tax exemption from a statute or treaty
that contains express exemptive language.' The court found that the tribe's
treaty was silent with respect to federal taxation.' In addition, the court did
not find any federal statute to support the tax exemption.'
Thus, the Ninth Circuit decided that an Indian tribe may be liable for
certain federal excise taxes, specifically including tax on the use of certain
highway motor vehicles,"t tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles,' tax
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983).
67. IR.C. § 4481 (1994).

68. Id.§ 4041(a).
69. Id. § 4041(b).
§§ 4061, 4218(a).
70. lit
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Confederated Tribes, 691 F.2d at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 881-83.
Id. at 880 (citing I.R.C. §§ 4041(g), 4221(a)(4), (dX4), 4482(cX1), and 4483(a)).

77. Id,
78. Id. at 881 (citing United States v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1980) and
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) (construing sections 5 and 6 of the General Allotment
Act of 1887 to create an express tax exemption for an Indian deriving income from his own trust

allotment)).
79.
80.
81.
82.

Confederated Tribes, 691 F.2d at 882.
Id. at 882-83.
I.R.C. § 4481 (1994).
Id. § 4041(a).
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on special fuels used in motor vehicles, and tax on manufacturing." This
leaves us with the question of whether the analysis of federal excise taxes in
Confederated Tribes extends to federal employment taxes. At least in the
Ninth Circuit, we can be certain that the court would apply a similar analysis
by determining whether the tribe is exempt as a State or political subdivision
of a state, whether the tribe is exempt because of language in a treaty, or
whether a federal statute applies to exempt the tribe from the tax. Since the
Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to have spoken on the issue with respect to
federal excise taxes, it is unclear how the other circuits would decide the issue
of whether federal employment taxes apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation
activities.
C. The IRS
In a series of revenue rulings regarding FICA and FUTA, the IRS takes the
position that the Indian tribe is liable for FICA and FUTA.' In examining
the IRS' position on the federal taxation of Indian tribes, it is appropriate to
look at what the IRS has said with respect to other areas of federal taxation.
For example, in Revenue Ruling 67-284, dealing with the federal income tax
status of enrolled members of Indian tribes, the IRS states that income tax
statutes do not tax Indian tribes and that the tribe is not a taxable entity."
However, the IRS provides no statutory or case law support for this
contention.
In Revenue Ruling 94-81, the IRS recognized that section 7871 of the
Code provides Indian tribes with limited exemptions from a variety of federal
excise taxes imposed on sellers of certain items if purchased by the tribe and
used in connection with the exercise of an essential government function."
Employment taxes are not mentioned here.
The IRS has stated its position with respect to tribal corporations in two
instances. In Revenue Ruling 94-16, the IRS has said that a corporation
owned by a tribe is not subject to federal income tax on income earned in the
conduct of commercial business on or off the reservation if the corporation
is formed under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act or under tribal
law." However, the ruling states that a corporation owned by a tribe and

83. Id. § 4041(b).
84. Id §§ 4061, 4218(a).
85. Rev. Rul. 68-493, 1968-2 C.B. 426; Rev. Rul. 59-354, 1959-2 C.B. 24; Rev. Rul. 56110, 1956-1 C.B. 4881; see Part 11I.A.
86. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55; see also Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19.
87. Rev. Rul. 94-81, 1994-2 C.B. 412. The ruling is specific to the limited exemption of
federal excise taxes provided under I.R.C. § 7871(b). The specific excise taxes mentioned arise
in chapter 31 (relating to tax on special fuels), chapter 32 (relating to manufacturers excise taxes),
subchapter B of chapter 33 (relating to communications excise tax) or subchapter D of chapter
36 (relating to tax on use of certain highway vehicles).
88. Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19.
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formed under state law will be subject to federal income tax. In addition, the
ruling states that it is limited in application to federal income taxes, and does
not apply to federal employment taxes." In Revenue Ruling 81-295, the IRS
stated that a federally chartered Indian tribal corporation has the same tax
status as the Indian tribe and is not taxable on income from activities carried
on within the boundaries of the reservation." Again, there is no
constitutional or statutory provision to support the contention that Indian tribes
are exempt from federal income taxation. The IRS in this ruling stated that
in general the political entity embodied in the concept of the Indian tribe has
been recognized and that no tax liability has been asserted with respect to
tribal income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the
reservation'
In contrast to the IRS's position that Indian tribes are liable for FICA and
FUTA, the IRS has taken the position with respect to other taxes that these
do not apply to the Indian tribe. The most significant is the IRS's position that
federal income taxes do not apply to the Indian tribe. Unfortunately the IRS
provides no authority for this contention which leaves us with a policy
argument. If policy is good enough to argue in one instance where Congress
has not spoken, then why can not policy be good enough to argue that
employment taxes should not apply to the Indian tribes' on-reservation
activity. Income taxes, like employment taxes, are not mentioned in section
7871, which provides tax exemptions for the tribe by treating it as a state.
The IRS in making its conclusion with respect to income taxes didn't seem to
be concerned that this was one of the taxes not accounted for in section 7871.
D. Conclusion
Congress has made it clear under section 3402(r) of the Code that federal
withholding applies to Indian tribes. In addition, Congress has stated in
section 7871 of the Code that there are certain taxes from which Indian tribes
are exempt. The Ninth Circuit has told us that it believes that federal excise
taxes apply to Indian tribes, although it did not specifically discuss federal
employment taxes. Finally, the IRS has taken the position that federal income
taxes, as well as certain excise taxes, do not apply to Indian tribes. The IRS
has been clear that it believes Congress intends for federal employment taxes
to apply to Indian tribes. The significance of Congress' power to amend and
make statutes clear as to their application is key to the discussion of whether
federal employment taxes apply to Indian tribes. If Congress has made clear

89. Id.

90. Rev. Rul. 81-295, 1981-2 C.B. 15. Once again, the IRS states that an Indian tribe is not
taxable on income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation. See Rev.
Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55; see also Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19.
91. Rev. Rul. 81-295 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding
that a tribe is not taxable on income earned within the boundaries of the reservation)).
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its intent that the withholding provisions apply to Indian tribes in section
3402(r), then why cannot Congress do the same with respect to FICA and
FUTA.
V. FederalIncome Taxation of Members
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether federal
taxes apply to the Indian tribe, they have addressed the issue of whether
income taxes apply to a tribal member's on-reservation activity in three
instances.' In addressing Congress' intent for federal employment taxes to
apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation activities, it is important to look at how
the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of federal taxation of member's
on-reservation activities as well as how Congress has dealt with the federal
taxation of a member's on-reservation activity.
A. Supreme Court Decisions
In Choteau v. Burnet, the Supreme Court held that a member's per capita
share of the tribe's mineral royalty income was subject to federal income
tax." In Choteau, the Indian owned his original allotment of tribal land as
well as a one-half interest in land that he inherited from a deceased
member.' The ownership of the land is not the issue in the case. The issue
is whether the receipt of income from the oil and gas leases is taxable. In the
division of the allotments of the tribal lands, oil, gas, and other minerals were
95
expressly reserved to the tribe for a period of twenty-five years. The
income from such leases was to be placed in the Treasury of the United States
and then distributed among the Indians quarterly.' The Court found that the
allotment itself was not taxable to the Indian but that the minerals were
taxable.97 The Court did not find that the minerals deserved the same
exemption as the allotment itself."
A few years later, the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Five Civilized
Tribes held that income derived from re-invested funds, which were originally
exempt because the income came directly from the restricted allotted land,
was subject to federal income tax." The result in this case is different from
the result in Squire v. Capoeman where the Court held that income derived
92. See Choteau v. Bumet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931); Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
93. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931).
94. Id. at 692. The provision in Choteau regarding the allotments is 25 U.S.C, § 331. This
provision is similar to the General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
95. Choteau, 283 U.S. at 692.
96. 1&.
97. Id. at 696.
98. Id.

99. Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295 U.S.
418 (1935).
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from the sale of timber from allotted land held by the United States on behalf
of the Indian member under the General Allotment Act was not subject to
0
federal income tax, specifically capital gains tax." The distinguishing factor
in Capoeman and Superintendentis that income which is "derived from the
land" is exempt from taxation, whereas re-invested funds are not exempt.
In all three cases, the Supreme Court speaks of restricted allotted land,
either under the General Allotment Act or similar acts. The purpose of the
General Allotment Act or similar acts is to give the individual allottee the
land at the end of the trust period free and clear of any encumbrance.'
Taxation puts the land at risk for a tax lien, which is inconsistent with this
purpose. It is clear from Capoeman that Congress did not intend to tax
income "derived from the land" that is representative of its value based on the
notion of giving the Indian the land free and clear of encumbrances at the end
of the trust period.'" However, when the income is re-invested, then
Superintendent tells us that the policy behind the exemption no longer

applies." The Court in Choteau did not discuss the mineral income as
"derived from the land," but felt that the Indians should pay tax on the
mineral income when received quarterly from the federal government.

Income derivedfrom the land within the meaning of the General Allotment
Act is income as a result of exploitation of the land itself such as mining,

logging, agriculture, or similar activity.'" The courts have also said that

income derived from business operations is not derived directly from the
land.'" Income derived from cattle ranching on trust lands, income for
services performed on tribal land, and income from holding a grazing permit
0
on tribal land is subject to federal income tax."

100. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
101. See General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389.
102. Capoeman, 351 U.S. at 6-7.
103. Superintendent, 295 U.S. at 420-21.
104. See United States v. Hallam, 304 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1962) (receiving income in form
of rents, royalties, and proceeds from restricted allotted lands exempt); Stevens v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 452 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1971) (fanning and ranching exempt); United States
v. Daney, 370 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1966) (receiving bonuses from oil and gas leases exempt); Big
Eagle v. United States, 300 F.2d 765 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (receiving royalties from tribal mineral
deposits exempt).
105. See Critzer v. United States, 597 F.2d 708 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (holding income from motel
not immune from federal taxation simply because businesses and buildings were physically
located on tax-exempt reservation land); see also Saunooke v. United States, 806 F.2d 1053 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (holding income from the operation of gift shops, motels, and a gas station located on
restricted allotted land were not exempt); Dillon v. United States, 792 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding income from the operation of a smoke shop located on restricted allotted land is subject
to federal income tax).
106. See United States v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding income derived
from cattle ranching under a tribal license on land held in trust is subject to income tax); Jourdain
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 617 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding income from the
tribal chairman is subject to income tax); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Walker, 326 F.2d
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The rationale of derivedfrom the land is that there must be a diminution
in the value of the land. For example, once logged off, the land is of little
value, and can no longer be adequate to the needs and serve the purpose of
bringing Indians finally to a state of competency and independence."°
Unless the proceeds are preserved for the allottee, then the Indian cannot go
forward when declared competent with the necessary chance of economic
survival in competition with others.M
Both Superintendentand Capoeman involve income earned by an Indian
while on the reservation. Both courts suggest that federal income tax statutes
apply to every individual who is a citizen of the United States unless
exempted by a treaty or a statute. This means that we look to see whether the
issue of taxation is dealt with in the relevant treaty, if a treaty is involved, or
we look to whether there is a federal statute, such as the General Allotment
Act which would exempt the income from taxation.
B. FederalStatutes
1. The GeneralAllotment Act of 1887
The General Allotment Act of 1887 and similar provisions authorized
allotments of reservation land to individual members of Indian tribes.'"
Under the General Allotment Act, members of tribes received individual
allotments to be held in trust by the United States, for the "sole use and
benefit" of the Indian allottees for a period of at least twenty-five years."0
At the end of the trust period, the land was to be conveyed to the allottee "in
fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charges or encumbrances
whatsoever.' The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 extended the periods
of trust until otherwise directed by Congress."'
At the end of the trust period, when the certificate of competency is issued,
'3
the member is to receive the land in fee simple and "free from all taxes.""

261 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that income received as compensation for services rendered is
taxable); Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding income from an Indian's
logging operations is subject to federal income tax where logging operations did not take place
on allotted lands); Holt v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 364 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1966)
(holding that a grazing permit on tribal land is subject to federal income tax upon profits allocable
to such lands arising from cattle operation).
107. Note that the "noncompetent" Indian often mentioned is one who lacks the legal
capacity to alienate the tribal land allotted to him under the provisions of the General Allotment
Act. See generally Jourdain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 617 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1980).
108. See Dillon v. United States, 792 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986).
109. General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
110. Id. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389.
Ill. Id.
112. Indian Reorganization Act of 1935, 25 U.S.C. § 462.
113. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1,8 (1956); see General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes
Act), § 5, 24 Stat. at 389.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2000

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

The courts have construed this to exempt the member from the federal income
tax of all income directly derived by a noncompetent Indian from restricted
allotted land."'
2. Treaty Fishing Rights, I.R.C. § 7873
Section 7873 of the Code provides that income earned by an individual
member or through a qualified Indian entity through the exercise of treaty
fishing rights is exempt from tax."' If the member earns the income from
the tribe by working in a tribally run fishing operation, based on the exercise
of treaty fishing rights,"' then that income is exempt from federal income
tax. In addition, section 7873 also states that no tax shall be imposed by
Subtitle C (federal employment taxes) on remuneration for services performed
in a fishing rights related activity of an Indian tribe by members of such
tribe." 7 Section 7873 is evidence of an instance where Congress has decided
that the exercise of treaty fishing rights, whether on or off the reservation, by
an Indian or Indian tribe are not subject to either federal income taxes or
federal employment taxes.
3. Interest Income from Tribal Bonds, .R. C. §§ 7871
Interest income from qualifying tribal bonds is exempt from federal income
tax in the hands of the owner of the bonds.' In order for the bonds to be
exempt, the tribe must use the proceeds to fund an "essential governmental
function.""' A qualified "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation,
or other organized group or community which is recognized as eligible for the
special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians
because of their status as Indians.'"
C. Conclusion
The Supreme Court in dealing with the question of whether an Indian
member pays federal income tax on income derived from the land has said
"no" in situations where the land involved is an allotment under the Dawes
Act or similar provisions.' Congress has addressed the restricted allotments

114. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1,6-7 (1956).
115. I.R.C. § 7873 (1994).
116. Id. § 7873(b)(1). A fishing rights related activity is one where substantially all of the
harvesting is performed by members of the tribe. Id. § 7873(b)(2). Recognized fishing rights are
those secured as of March 17, 1988 by treaty between the tribe and the United States, an
executive order, or an Act of Congress.
117. Id § 7873(a)(2).
118. IL § 7871(a)(4). The exemption applies to all taxpayers that hold tribal bonds.
119. Id. § 7871(c)(1), (e). Essential government function shall not include any function,
which is not customarily performed by State and local governments with general taxing powers.
120. Id. § 7871(c)(3)(E)(ii).
121. General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
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in the Dawes Act and the Courts have construed "free of all taxes" to mean
that there is an exemption from federal income tax of all income directly
derived from the land.' Thus, we are typically looking at a member's onreservation activity with respect to his restricted allotment. Congress also
decided to give the Indians an exemption for income earned from the exercise
of treaty fishing rights," whether exercised on or off the reservation, and
an exemption for interest income from tribal bonds." Congress does not
speak to employment taxes as they apply to individual Indians, except in
relation to the exercise of treaty fishing rights."
With respect to the issue of whether Congress intended for federal
employment taxes to apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation activity, the
General Allotment Act and the Supreme Court decisions regarding income
derived from the land are the most helpful in determining how Congress
addresses federal tax issues with individual Indians. Because income derived
from the land does not include income earned from businesses located on the
restricted allotments; it is not likely to exempt other taxes that apply to these
businesses, such as federal employment taxes. However, the rationale behind
the exemption from tax of income derivedfrom the land is based on the idea
that Congress intended that the individual Indian receives the land clear of
encumbrances to provide the necessary chance of economic survival in
competition with others. The limitation of income derived from the land
makes sense when applied to individual Indians. However, the limitation of
income derivedfrom the land has not been extended to the federal taxation of
an Indian tribe. Congress may equally feel that the Indian tribe should be
accorded the necessary chance of economic survival in competition with
others. In the same manner as an individual Indian's allotment is protected
from federal taxation, Congress may wish to protect tribal businesses on
reservation lands from employment taxes. That Congress thought to exclude
income earned from the exercise of treaty fishing rights from employment
taxes is another example of where Congress has made its intent clear with
respect to employment taxes.'
VI. Statutes of GeneralApplication and Indian Sovereignty
As a backdrop to the discussion of whether Congress intends for
employment taxes to apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation activity, we must
consider both the notion that statutes of general application do not apply to
Indian tribes and Indian sovereignty. These concepts tend to give support as

122. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1,6-7 (1956).
123. I.R.C. § 7873 (1994).
124. Id. § 7871(aX4).

125. Id.§ 7873(a)(2).
126. Id.
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to "why" federal employment taxes should or should not apply to the Indian
tribes.
A. General Statutes
The Supreme Court in 1884 in Elk v. Wilkins recognized that general acts
of Congress did not apply to Indians unless so expressed as to clearly
manifest an intention to include them,"z and followed this for three-fourths
of a century. However, in 1960, the Supreme Court in Federal Power
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation held that statutes of general
application do apply to Indian tribes." Although neither Elk v. Wilkins nor
Tuscarora involved federal taxes, the lower courts have often cited to
language in Tuscarorastating that "it is well settled by many decisions of this
Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians
and their property interests. ' "
The Ninth Circuit in Donovan v. Coeurd'Alene Tribal Farm followed the
Tuscarora decision that general statutes in terms applying to all persons
include Indians and their property interests.'O Donovan stated that in the
Ninth Circuit, the courts have used the language of Tuscarora to justify the
general application of federal tax statutes to Indian tribes and individual
Indians unless an express treaty or statutory provision grants a tax
exemption.' The Donovan court cites to two tax cases where the Ninth
Circuit has applied the Tuscarorarule.'
In Confederated Tribes, the Ninth Circuit held that the Indian tribe was
liable for various excise taxes.' The court based its decision that the Indian
tribe is liable for the various excise taxes on its finding that there was no
exemption. The tribe is not considered a State or political subdivision under
the statutes in question and the court found no federal statute or language in
a treaty to exempt the tribe from the tax." As previously discussed,

127. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (involving an Indian who had not become a

"naturalized citizen" and as such was not accorded protection under the phrase "Indians not taxed"
phrase of the 14th Amendment).
128. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960) (finding that
land purchased in New York in 1804 by a tribe in fee with funds from a sale of tribal lands
located in North Carolina was not a reservation for purposes of the Federal Power Act).
129. Id. at 116.
130. Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
the Occupational Safety and Health Act applied to the commercial activities carried on by an
Indian tribal farm).
131. Id. at 1115-16.
132. Id.(citing Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983) and Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978)).
133. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983). See supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
134. Confederated Tribes, 691 F.2d at 881-83.
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Confederated Tribes does not discuss federal employment taxes.'35 That the
Ninth Circuit may try to extend the same analysis to federal employment
taxes is possible. However, none of the other circuit courts of appeals have
spoken with regard to whether federal excise taxes or federal employment
taxes apply to Indian tribes.
In Fry v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that an individual Indian
was liable for income tax from logging operations that were performed on
lands other than allotted lands.'" The result in this case depended on
whether the income was income derived from the land.' Because the lands
involved were not allotted lands, the court found no reason to extend to these
lands the same analysis applied to under the General Allotment Act or similar
provisions based on the concept that the individual allottees are to receive the
land "free of taxes" at the end of the trust period.'
As previously discussed the Donovan decision cites to these two tax cases,
Confederated Tribes and Fry, for the proposition that general federal laws
apply to Indian tribes.'3 Although the rule from Tuscarora that statutes of
general application apply to Indian tribes may be one factor in these decisions,
this analysis is secondary. The decision in Confederated Tribes turned on a
review of the taxing statutes, the treaty, and other federal statutes in search
of an exemption. The decision in Fry also looked to whether the income from
the lands involved was exempt by a treaty or act of Congress. In the Ninth
Circuit, these cases may stand for the proposition that taxing statutes of
general application apply to Indian tribes unless there is some treaty or federal
statute that provides an exemption. However, many of the treaties for tribes
probably did not contemplate federal taxation. There also may be Indian tribes
without treaties. With respect to an act of Congress, we are dealing with
instances where Congress has not spoken. The Ninth Circuit assumes that
congressional silence means that Congress intended to tax. However, we
know that in some instances Congress can and has said when a particular
statute does or does not apply to an Indian tribe. "
In the Ninth Circuit, the court in United States v. Farrisoutlines three
exceptions to the Tuscarorarule that statutes of general application apply to
Indian tribes.'"' United States v. Farrisprovides three exceptions: (1) the

135. See supranotes 66-84 and accompanying text.
136. Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
137. This is the same analysis used in Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Squire v. Capoeman. See supra notes 100-03.
138. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
139. Donovan, 751 F.2d at 1115-16.
140. See supra Parts IV.A, V.B; see I.R.C. §§ 3402(r), 7871, 7873; General Allotment Act
of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
141. See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 1111
(1981), superseded by United States v. E.C. Investments, Inc., 77 F.3d 327 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing how IGRA eliminated the public policy test of Public Law 280 followed in United
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law touches on the exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters, (2) the application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights
guaranteed by Indian treaties, or (3) there is proof by the legislative history
or some other means that Congress intended the law not to apply to Indians
on reservations. 43 With respect second exception for treaties, the courts have
recognized that a treaty can provide an exemption from federal taxation to
Indians but none of the cases have been decided based on a treaty.'" For
those tribes that have treaties, they may not have contemplated federal
taxation. However, there may be history, which supports a tax exemption.
There are also some tribes who do not have treaties. In reviewing the tax
status of any tribe, the message here is to check the relevant treaties.
With respect to the third exception, the General Allotment Act and sections
7871 and 7873 of the Internal Revenue Code are examples of "other means"
provided by Congress that show that Congress intended the law not to apply
The Farris case holds that Congress must
to Indians on reservations.
mention in its legislative history that the statute does not apply to Indians."
A requirement that Congress mention that the statute does not apply to Indian
tribes in its legislative history advocates the position that all statutes apply to
Indian tribes unless Congress provides otherwise. If all statutes of general
application apply to Indian tribes unless Congress states the statute does not
apply to the Indian tribe in the legislative history of the statute, then why did
Congress amend section 3402(r) of the Code to provide that the Indian tribe
7
must withhold from members payments from certain casino profits?" If
Congress did not mention that the statute did not apply to Indian tribes in its
legislative history, then under Tuscarorawe are to presume the statute applied
to Indian tribes. Based on this rule, Congress would not have had to amend
section 3402 of the Code.
Elk v. Wilkins required that Congress manifest an intent to include Indians.
Section 3402(r) provides us with an instance where Congress amended the
statute to make its intent clear. The Farrisrule may bind the Ninth Circuit;
however, other circuits may see that Congress can and has said when statutes
apply to the Indian tribes, and may decide that Congress has not made its
intent clear.
In determining Congress' intent, the Ninth Circuit has said that it is clear
that taxing statutes apply to everyone, including Indian tribes, unless there is

States v. Farris)).
142. There has been no discussion of tribal self-governance to this point. This exception will
be discussed as part of Indian Sovereignty in Part VII.B.
143. Farris,624 F.2d at 892-94.
144. See generally Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
145. See supra Parts IV.A, V.B; I.R.C. §§ 7871, 7873; General Allotment Act of 1887
(Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
146. Farris,624 F.2d at 893-94.
147. I.R.C. § 3402(r) (1994); see supra Part IV.A.I.
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a treaty exemption, a federal statute providing an exemption, or Congress has
said in the legislative history that Indians or Indian tribes are exempt from
taxation." Outside of the Ninth Circuit, other courts could follow Elk v.
Wilkins"" and take the position that statutes of general application do not
apply to Indian tribes unless there is a manifest intent to include them.
Farris provides another exception to the rule in Tuscarorawhere the law
touches on the exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters."5 The right to self-governance is also referred to as "Indian
sovereignty." Part VI(B) below will address Indian sovereignty as a backdrop
to the discussion of whether federal employment taxes should apply to Indian
tribes' on-reservation activities.
B. Indian Sovereignty
Another plausible argument is that Congress did not intend for federal
employment taxes to apply to the Indian tribes' on-reservation activity because
these taxes interfere with the tribes' sovereign immunity. As early as 1831,
the Supreme Court recognized that Indian nations have long been "distinct,
political communities having territorial boundaries within which their authority
is exclusive.''
The Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
recognized "Indian sovereignty" must serve "as a backdrop against which
applicable federal statute[s] must be read."'" Although Santa Clara Pueblo
does not involve federal taxes, it does tell us that there must be a clear
indication of legislative intent to give proper respect for "tribal sovereignty"
and the plenary authority of Congress over the Indian tribes.'1 In Santa
Clara Pueblo, "tribal sovereignty" prevailed and the Court found that the
Indian Civil Rights Act, which grants certain enumerated rights to individual
Indians, did not waive the sovereign immunity of the tribe or create a cause
of action against the tribe." The right to tribal self-government is ultimately
dependent on and subject to the broad powers of Congress."5

148. Farris,624 F.2d at 892-94; see Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113
(9th Cir. 1984); see also Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d
878 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied,460 U.S. 1040 (1983); Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
149. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
150. Farris,624 F.2d at 893.
151. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
152. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (involving a cause of action
against the tribe for relief against enforcement of an ordinance denying tribal membership to

children of female members who married outside of the tribe).
153. Id. The Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo stated that although tribes have the
power to regulate their internal and social relations, and make and enforce their own substantive
law, Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local selfgovernment possessed by the tribe. 1d at 60.
154. d at 72.
155. See Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comn'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (stating
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One commentator has said that "the backdrop of sovereignty has meant that
state power is presumed not to apply to tribal members in Indian
Country."' m In order to determine whether "Indian sovereignty" protects
Indian tribes and tribal lands and Indian activities on tribal lands from federal
taxation, we must look at what the Supreme Court has said in federal tax
cases. The Supreme Court has said that the doctrine of Indian sovereignty
protects the tribes from state taxation or state law in the absence of federal
law expressly allowing it.' These cases involve the notion of "Indian
sovereignty" as protecting the tribe from state taxation or state laws, but none
involve the protection of an Indian tribe from federal taxation.
The three Supreme Court decisions that discussed the federal taxation of
Indians, Choteau v. Burnet, Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v.
Commissionerof Internal Revenue, and Squire v. Capoeman, did not discuss
Indian sovereignty.' The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Cabazon did
not discuss Indian sovereignty in its discussion of federal employment
taxes.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Confederated Tribes
addressed tribal self-government when considering whether the Tribe was
considered a State or political subdivision of a state."W There, the notion of
Indian sovereignty was used to differentiate the Indian tribe from a State and
not to provide a reason for exempting the tribe from federal excise taxes..''.
Finally, the District Court of Nevada in Washoe Tribes disagreed with the
that the traditional notions of Indian self-government provide an important backdrop against

which vague and ambiguous statutes must be measured).
of TribalSovereignty under the Constitution,
156. Erik M. Jensen, The Continuing Vitality
60 MONT. L. REV. 3 n.23 (1999) (emphasis added).
157. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comrn'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (holding
that Arizona's sales tax did not apply to the sale of farm machinery to the Gila River Indian tribe
where the sale took place on the reservation); Oklahoma Tax Comn'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508
U.S. 114 (1993) (holding a state cannot impose a vehicle excise tax on members who lived in
"Indian Country"); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (holding
that Oklahoma's gasoline excise tax whose legal incidence fell on the tribe could not be imposed
absent congressional authorization); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985)
(holding Montana could not impose its coal severance tax on royalty interests owned by a tribe
under a lease with a private coal company); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145
(1973) (holding that the operation of a ski resort off the reservation was subject to gross receipts
tax); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (holding
that New Mexico gross receipts tax could not be imposed on a non-Indian company that
contracted with a tribe to build a school because of the federal regulation).
158. See Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931); see also Superintendent of Five Civilized
Tribes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); see also Squire v. Capoeman,
351 U.S. 1 (1956); supra Part V.A.
159. See In re Cabazon Indian Casino v. IRS, 57 B.R. 398 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); supraPart
III.B.
160. ConfederatedTribes, 691 F.2d at 879. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the right to
tribal self-government is dependent on and subject to the powers of Congress. The court said that
this is what distinguishes tribes from states. See supra Part IV.B.
161. Id.
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plaintiff that the independent sovereignty of the Indian tribes has the
consequence of overruling many decisions sustaining federal taxing power.'"
Because there is no authority extending "sovereign immunity" to protect
Indian tribes from federal taxation, it does not serve as a helpful "backdrop"
to our discussion.
VI. Canons of Construction in Indian Law
In reviewing the Supreme Court decisions regarding the taxation of Indian
tribes, there is discussion of the federal canons of construction with respect
to Indian law. In discussing these canons, the canons of federal tax law tell
us that exemptions should be strictly construed." A competing maxim, in
the area of Indian law, is that any ambiguities in federal statutes should be
construed in favor of the Indian tribes.'" Although these canons are not
dispositive of the decisions, they do provide a backdrop for the discussion of
whether the federal employment taxes should apply to Indian tribes' onreservation activity.
As early as 1832, the Supreme Court stated that the language used in
treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice.'" In
Choate v. Trapp, the Supreme Court applied the federal canons of Indian law
outside of the treaty context to a federal statute.'6 At issue was the state
taxation of individual Indians.'" The Court found an exemption based on
federal law." In Choate, the Court recognized a more liberal rule with
respect to construing statutes in cases involving Indians as opposed to the
normal rule strict construction of tax exemptions." The Supreme Court in
Choate recognized that the rule of more liberal construction in favor of
Indians had been recognized for more than one hundred years by the Court,
without exception, and applied in tax cases."'
162. Washoe Tribes v. United States, 44 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 79-6006 (D. Nev. 1979). The
court declined to follow plaintiffs argument that Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49

(1978), and its victory for tribal self-government had the effect of overruling the power of federal
taxation. For a discussion of Washoe Tribes, see supra Part III.B.
163. C.S.R. Centennial Say. Bank v. FSB, 499 U.S. 573,583-84 (stating that exclusions from
gross income should be narrowly construed); Commissioner of Internal Revenue Serv. v.
Jacobson, 236 U.S. 28, 49 (1949) (same).
164. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
(concurring in the result, Justice Mlean first articulated recognition of the canons
165. Id.
of Indian law).
166. See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912) (holding Indians exempt from state tax based

on federal statutes providing that lands exempt from tax while remained in hands of original
allottees).
167. See i&at 671.
168. See iLat 678-79. The Atoka Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement provided that
the members of the tribes should have allotted to them shares of land nontaxable while the land
remained in the hands of the original allottee.
169. 1d at 675.
170. Id. (citing The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5Wall.) 737, 760 (1866) (discussing whether
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One commentator has stated that there are two tenets of Indian law
considered in interpreting federal statutes: (1) terms should be liberally
construed to benefit Indians, and (2) ambiguities should be resolved in favor
of the Indians.'" The canons of construction were part of the analysis of
Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes and Capoeman.'n Although each
Court considered the policy of a more liberal construction in favor of Indian
tribes, the decisions turned on whether the income involved was income
derived from the land."° Although it is important from a policy perspective
to apply the federal Indian law canons,' 7' the canons have played a
secondary role in the Court's decisions of whether Indians are exempt from
federal taxation. If the Supreme Court were to decide the issue of whether
federal employment taxes apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation activities, then
the Court must consider whether the same policy considerations to prompt a
more "liberal" rule of construction in favor of Indians applies today. If the
canons of federal Indian law apply with respect to this issue, then the Indian
tribe can argue that the ambiguity as to whether RCA and FUTA apply to the
Indian tribe should be construed in favor of Indian tribes. On the other hand,
the IRS could argue that the canons of federal Indian law do not apply to
construe the FICA and FUTA statutes. In order to prevail, the IRS would
have to show that the policy behind more liberal construction does not apply
with respect to federal employment taxes and their application to Indian tribes'
on-reservation activities.
VIII. Conclusion
It is not clear that Congress intended for FICA and FUTA to apply to
75
Indian tribes' on-reservation activities. Although the IRS' and the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel', have said that federal employment
taxes apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation activities, the Supreme Court and
a statute prohibiting the levy and sale of Indians lands prevented a sale for state tax purposes, and
applying the "enlarged" rules of construction adopted in reference to Indian treaties)).
171. David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis, and Dependent Indian
Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L REv. 37, 45 (1999).
172. See Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 295
U.S. 418 (1935); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); supra Part V.A.
173. Id. The discussion of the cases in Part V.A distinguishes them based on "income
derived from the land."
174. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), emphasized that the relationship
between the United States and the Indians as an "unlettered" people, wards of the United States,
warranted a more liberal construction in favor of the Indians, who were at an unequal bargaining
position in the context of treaties. This concept of "liberal construction" was then extended to
apply to federal statutes in Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
175. See Rev. Rul. 59-354, 1959-2 C.B. 24; see also Rev. Rul. 56-110, 1956-1 C.B. 488;
supra Part III.A.
176. See In re Cabazon Indian Casino v. IRS, 57 B.R. 398 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); supraPart
III.B.
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the United States Court of Appeals have not spoken with respect to this issue.
Congress has stated its intent as to whether federal taxes apply to Indian tribes
in the withholding provisions,"n the Tribal Tax Act, 7' and with respect to
Indians' treaty fishing rights."" On the one hand, with respect to
withholding, we know that Congress has the ability to amend a statute to
make it clear that it applies to an Indian tribe. On the other hand, there are
a variety of federal excise taxes mentioned in the Tribal Tax Act,18° but there
is no mention of federal employment taxes. The failure to mention the
application of federal employment taxes to Indian tribes is a weakness of the
Tribal Tax Act.
In the income tax arena, the IRS has stated that Indian tribes are not
subject to income tax."' However, the IRS has not provided any statutory
or case law support for this statement. In its revenue rulings, the IRS has
made clear that it believes federal employment taxes apply to Indian
tribes." It is unclear how policy can protect the Indian tribe from one tax
and not the other. The cases regarding federal income tax deal with individual
Indians and not Indian tribes." These cases are concerned with whether
income is derived from the land and whether there is a federal statute, such
as the General Allotment Act'" or a similar provision, to exempt the income
from tax.
The Ninth Circuit believes that Congress intended for federal excise taxes
to apply to Indian tribes." In fact, they are the only circuit to have spoken
on an Indian tribe's liability for federal taxation. Although the analysis of the
Ninth Circuit may extend to federal employment taxes if a case is brought
before the Ninth Circuit, the other circuits have not spoken on the issue. It is
not clear that the circuits agree that federal employment taxes apply to Indian
tribes' on-reservation activities.
There are many notions, which may provide a backdrop to our discussion
of whether federal employment taxes apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation
activities. The Supreme Court has said that statutes of general application do
not apply to Indian tribes." However, the Supreme Court has also said in

177. See I.R.C. § 3402(r) (1994); supra Part IV.A.I.
178. See I.R.C. § 7871 (1994); supra Part IV.A.2.
179. See I.R.C. § 7873 (1994); supra Part V.B.2.
180. See I.R.C. § 7871 (1994); supra Part IV.A.2.
181. See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2C.B. 55; see alsoRev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19; supra
Part IV.C.
182. See Rev. Rul. 59-354, 1959-2 C.B. 24; see also Rev. Rul. 56-110, 1956-1 C.B. 488;
supra Part III.A.
183. See supra Part V.A.
184. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
185. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983); see supra Part IV.B.
186. See Elk v. Willdns, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); supra Part VI.A.
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an opinion involving the Federal Power Act that statutes of general
application, such as taxing statutes, apply to Indian tribes."' The Ninth
Circuit has said that general taxing statutes apply to Indian tribes.' In the
Ninth Circuit, a general statute applies to an Indian tribe unless the law
interferes with tribal self-governance, a treaty speaks to the matter, or
legislative history or other congressional proof says otherwise.'" It is clear
that the Ninth Circuit believes that statutes of general application apply to
Indian tribes. However, other circuits are free to decide whether or not they
agree with the Ninth Circuit.
With respect to tribal sovereignty, the doctrine does not defeat the
application of federal taxes to an Indian tribe. With respect to treaties, some
Indian tribes may not have contemplated federal taxing statutes at the time the
treaties were drawn. Today, some tribes do not have treaties. With respect to
the legislative history, the Ninth Circuit says that Congress must provide that
the statute does not apply to Indian tribes. 9° The Ninth Circuit is not correct
in its holding. If we assume that the federal employment statutes have applied
to Indian tribes, then we are in effect allowing Congress to make an
amendment without ever having to make an actual amendment. If this were
true, then Congress need not have amended the Code with respect to
withholding to state that the provision affirmatively applied to Indian tribes.
In addition, the rich history and policy of construing statutes more liberally
in favor of Indian tribes has been utilized by the courts as a backdrop to the
discussion of the application of taxing statutes to Indians.' Unless everyone
agrees that the Indian tribes have reached a state of competency and
independence, then we need to consider the canons of construction in favor
of Indian tribes.
Given that not everyone has spoken on the issue, it is unfair to say that
everyone agrees that Congress intended for federal employment taxes to apply
to Indian tribes' on-reservation activities. In fact, we should not read
congressional silence in the area of FICA and FUTA taxes as an indication
that the taxes apply to Indian tribes' on-reservation activity. It is not unfair
given our rich history with the Indian tribes to require that Congress make its
intent clear with respect to the application of federal employment taxes to
Indian tribes' on-reservation activities.

187. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960); supra Part
VI.A.
188. See Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1984); supra Part
VIA.
189. See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1I11
(1981); supra Part VI.A.

190. Farris,624 F.2d at 893-94.
191. See supra Part VII.
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